Giving the sea-dog a bad name

I promise not to repost old posts again- at least not soon!- but this is a 2012 one I was forced to recall today.

The notion that a ship's Captain is similar in quality or character to a shore based CEO or senior manager is hogwash that has been promoted by the STCW 'management level' certificate claptrap for far too long. Perhaps this way of defining responsibilities at sea may find some takers among sailors who have a complex about their jobs being inferior to those ashore, but as far as I am concerned, this narrow profiling actually devalues what they do. Because I believe that a Master's job is tougher than a CEO's. In fact, the nuances in leadership, strategic or tactical thinking, physical action and mental agility required of a ship Captain- or, indeed, of any rank of officer or crew at sea- are unique. The 'management' or 'operational' level labels are plainly inaccurate. This is not an office, where a manager does no manual work. This is a ship, whose senior most officers often live in boiler suits these days. 

A CEO ashore is probably responsible for larger amounts of money, but no CEO lives, works and eats with his workforce. No CEO faces the same living conditions as the shop floor worker. No CEO suffers acute fatigue and loss of sleep for prolonged periods while making major decisions that affect directly the physical safety of everybody around, including himself. No CEO picks up a screwdriver at work one minute and handles a multimillion-dollar floating behemoth the next. No CEO makes huge decisions all on his own. No CEO is required to be- within any 24 hour period- alternately a clerk, an operator of machinery or equipment, a HR man, a security in charge, a factory manager, a data entry operator, a communications officer, a cashier, an accountant, a payroll controller, a policeman and an environmental mini-specialist. No CEO is required to work while spending months away from his family at a stretch. No CEO will be arrested for even a major disaster- leave alone a minor accident- in most parts of the world: Bhopal, for example. Hell, a CEO does not even stand on his feet too much or too often; he travels, works and lives in a soothing atmosphere with minions to take care of everything, including his cup of coffee. A  Shipmaster, on the other hand, works in a hostile environment- physical and mental both- that is magnified manifold by most of the people he encounters that are not part of his crew- the antagonistic enemies at the gate. 

When a CEO makes a huge mistake, the company goes bankrupt and everybody loses their jobs; when a Captain makes a huge mistake, everybody dies and everything around is polluted forever.

You may choose what you consider to be the more important job here; my only point is that any sailor's job cannot be compared with any job ashore- and promoting that thinking does every seaman an injustice, is inaccurate and pushes the wrong idea- to prospective and existing seafarers both- of what a mariner's working life is all about.

Actually, I cannot think of any job that compares with a sailor's. A soldier's?  Some similarities do exist here- away from family in a hostile environment, for example, but there are massive differences too. A sailor will not be called upon to face bullets as part of his job description, piracy notwithstanding. A solider's life is simpler than a mariners- no commercial, environmental or such considerations and no job insecurity. On the other hand, although a Bosun's job is more complex than a platoon leader's, the latter is responsible much more for the lives of all his men in combat, and the cost of a mistake- or circumstance- is much higher. In a similar vein, a General is far away from the action, usually, unlike a Shipmaster, but he is responsible for hundreds or thousands of lives and his country's security- a huge responsibility. So, no real parallel exists here either. 

I suggest that we should not even try to find a parallel. Instead, we need to realise that a mariner's job description and responsibilities are unique and leave it at that. A formal job description is required only when there is ambiguity or confusion about role, and shipping has never suffered from that problem. Just say Chief Engineer, and every sailor on earth will know what that man does, his responsibility and his authority. This is true for all other ranks, and on any ship on earth.  We don't need organisation charts at sea; we know clearly what everybody is responsible for.

Unfortunately, what has happened is that shipping has fallen into the management jargon trap where style substitutes for substance- or too often replaces substance. The result is not pretty and is there for all to see. Crews are today groaning under the weight of manuals and checklists that have dubious value but enormous repercussions thanks to stress and fatigue that are a direct result of this nonsense. I see the 'management level' certification and the 'CEO' pretentious blah as an extension of this thinking. 

It may seem like a small thing, the wording on a certificate of competency, but it does matter, and I object strongly to it. Not least because I am a Shipmaster by qualification and profession, not a mere CEO.

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Command failure

 

When a forty-five year old Master- with eleven years of command experience under his belt- tells me that he has pretty severe family problems at home but is nonetheless compelled to rejoin his last company since they have 'given him a call', I know one thing for sure: he will not be doing his job properly on board, because he is typical of the Captain who will bow to pressure every time it is applied to him- or even when it is not.

To be fair, I have seen this trait- the desire to be ingratiating at whatever cost-  more amongst officers who work for ship management companies, even more so if they have been associated with a single firm for a large chunk of their careers. Ownership companies- if they manage their own ships directly- are generally more practical. They look at longer-term interests and associations; they understand that the relationship is symbiotic, and so do- mostly- the people who work for them. There is therefore more give and take on both sides. The idea is to work together; much better than the Big Daddy culture that permeates especially the larger shipmanning setups.

The problem is that a management setup is, despite claims to the contrary, usually just body shopping. A management firm is an intermediary that puts its own interests way ahead of the ship owner's- an idea that is directly at odds with any Captain's responsibility, where the interests of the crew, cargo and owner (not manager) must be protected first. It is not surprising, therefore, that many of these companies have more than their fair share of Masters who are either spineless or are unable to assert their authority, for strong self-assurance is not rewarded here. Gutless behaviour, on the other hand, will keep all those clerks happy in the office- that in turn will guarantee you a job, it is hoped.

How many times have I heard submissive senior officers say of a management company, "This company is good; they have 150 ships. Even if one ship owner does not like you, they will put you on another ship." This attitude spills over into all facets of work. These Masters and Chief Engineers keep a low profile, hesitating to make a call or postponing important decisions, hesitating to stick their neck out, expending huge effort in doing little except sitting out their contracts. Their lack of confidence is staggering- and, on a ship, dangerous.

I know why companies promote such shooting-yourself-in-the-foot kind of behaviour, but they can only be blamed for this wishy-washy culture up to a point; the truth is that many senior Masters and Chief Engineers will happily crawl when they are asked to kneel. I have come across these officers too often, showing a spineless eagerness to break the rules or compromise on safety for commercial advantage. I have seen them overloading ships, sailing without essential spares, compromising on the safety of navigation, pumping out oil, cheating on cargo and bunker figures, accepting substandard safety equipment, nickel and diming the crew with wages, working conditions or food and generally behaving like clerks in a government office rather than senior officers responsible for two dozen crew and a ship with its cargo. Even when nobody in the office hints that they push the safety envelope, they often do so anyway, perhaps to demonstrate their warped loyalty to the company. All of which comes under the heading of 'not doing your real job', in my book.

Ignoring all expletives (something I am finding very difficult to do here), I want to tell my friend-the one who is ready to rejoin- many things. I want to tell him that a self-effacing nature is good only if it is not the outcome of a lack of self-confidence. Rejoin if you must; that is less important than my belief that your attitude, continued on board, makes you unfit to be a Master. 

Remember your first loyalty is to the ship, its crew and cargo. This is not my opinion; this is the law. Remember the ship owner comes before the ship manager- you can figure out where loyalty to yourself fits into all this.

Remember that the crew, owner or ship manager do not have to like you. Much better if they respect your professional competence; that, after all, is what you are being paid for. So make decisions, even the tough ones; that is your prerogative, not that of some accountant in some office- or even the Superintendent's. Remember that an ingratiating person may be liked but he is usually never respected. Besides, somebody like me automatically questions the competence of a person who is always bending over backwards for nothing.

Remember that it is not enough to know your job; you have to execute it. Which means being tough but fair with everybody- crew and managers included. Which means being able to say no to the crew- or the head of your body shopping setup. Which means being assertive- sometimes aggressively so. This is called being in Command. A Master who is forever eager to jump through hoops and wag his tail in an attempt to ingratiate himself with an organisation with which he has a contractual relationship is not in Command.  

Realise that the safety of the ship is paramount, and you are required- by law and otherwise- to put your foot down whenever attempts are made to pressure you into taking short cuts. Remember that this often entails an aggressive stance that is completely at variance with an ingratiating attitude. The managers or owners who push you really have no option if you say no. They can replace you, sure, but that will come later. Until they do, however, they have to do what you say, Meanwhile- in Connery's words from the movie- they are stuck between a rock and a hard case.

I want to tell him that anybody who is unwilling to take responsibility for his job on a ship- or somebody who is happy to outsource his decision making to sometimes unqualified, often unaware and probably less experienced people sitting thousands of miles away- is not fit to be given the responsibility to begin with. 

I want to tell him that he has been a merchant ship Captain for more than a decade; it is time he started behaving like one.

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The Master and no Margarita

Bulgakov’s “The Master and Margarita” is one of my favourite books. A satirical story set in the days of Stalin’s Moscow, it includes the devil as one of the main characters. Margarita, incidentally, is the ‘Master’s’ mistress. Much like the story connected with banning of alcohol on many ships today, the novel is a strange, satirical and often absurd tale. Somebody described it once as Dante’s Inferno meeting the Marx Brothers.


Coincidentally, the Margarita also happened to be (note the tense, please) one of my favourite drinks at sea. My preferred version had three parts of tequila, one part of triple sec and one part of fresh lemon juice. Crushed ice, chilled salt rimmed glass and shaken, not stirred. One drink in the smoke room in the evening before dinner. ‘The Master and a Margarita’, I sometimes joked.


Then the powers that want to be decided to treat me like a retarded child.


Much like Bulgakov’s story that sometimes reads like a story within a story, the evolution, if one can call it that, of the ‘Drug and Alcohol policy’ on board ships is yet another matryoshka doll exercise at sea. Much like those Russian dolls one inside another, one rule pops out of another in the D and A policy too. At the end of it all, the smallest pygmy dolls and the most draconian steps emerge. These dolls then decide that Masters and crews can be trusted with sometimes a couple of hundred million dollars worth of ship and cargo, but they cannot be trusted with a can of beer. They decide that there will be no alcohol carried or drunk on their ships at anytime, anywhere. Ever.


And what is worse, these dolls get away with it.


In no other industry anywhere in the world is a worker subjected to such harsh restrictions on his personal choices over months on end. Perhaps astronauts at space stations are, and so are Saudi Arabian residents and jailbirds elsewhere, but nowhere else is such an exercise even attempted. Restrictions may well apply to people operating machinery, to pilots and many others, but they do not do so twenty four hours a day over a nine month contract. There would be uproar if this measure were even mooted elsewhere.


I am well aware (how can I not be?) of the history and the rationale behind the arguments in favour of a complete alcohol ban. I am not advocating drunk crews operating ships as the alternative here. What I am advocating is this: it is high time everybody in the industry, including charterers, owners, managers and ship vetters, started treating me like a Master and not like a wayward juvenile delinquent. It is high time everybody started treating crews with some respect and not like they are some dumb animals that must be controlled or else they will run amuck after being intoxicated to the gills.


I am also advocating leaving the subject of alcohol intake of the crew to where it rightfully belongs: with the Master. I imagine that this gentleman, who the dolls give overriding authority on paper to protect themselves not all that long ago, should be able to stop the crew getting inebriated regularly. He did that earlier, before the days of the headmasters, didn’t he?


Sure, have a zero tolerance for drunkenness. Use the breathanalysers and urine testers freely. Let the axe fall on defaulters. However, for those many companies that bar any alcohol at all on board (and, if you are an Indian seaman, there are too many), I say this: Treat people like adults. Leave some things to the good sense of the individual and the Master. In addition, in Ronald Reagan’s words, trust but verify. Your crews are responsible for much bigger things than a bottle of beer. If most of them can handle those, most of them can handle a beer too.


Instances of alcohol abuse have sometimes occurred when people drink too much just before their ship is due to sail. Remember the Exxon Valdez? In many such cases, the reason people drink too much ashore is that no alcohol is available on board after sailing. If it were, they would not be tempted to go on a binge, I think, and certainly not at a waterfront bar just before sailing. Why do that when you can enjoy a drink in peace in the open sea?


This Master, for example, would rather have his single Margarita a day or two after sailing out of port, when in the open sea, rather than just before departure. That is just common sense. Besides, have any of the matryoshka dolls making these rules sailed in recent times with port stays, regulations and short manned crews being what they are? Come on, we are fudging port rest periods here. Do you think we have time to get sozzled regularly?


A couple of years ago I sailed on board a Scandinavian vessel before it was taken over by us. The Master, officers and crew were liberal in their intake of alcohol with every meal, and on most evenings, weekend barbecues and parties. Although Margaritas were not on offer, everything from beer to cognac to Schnapps was. Having seen and heard of similar instances where at least some Western mariners are allowed, by their companies, to drink alcohol freely on board, I wondered why the head masterly ‘zero alcohol’ rules seemed to be reserved largely for Asian mariners.


In this context, a slightly surreal story is that of Capt. Phimister’s recent trail in the UK. In November 2007, Capt. Phimister went ashore from the support vessel ‘VOS Viper’ with Chief Officer Gordon Buchan to celebrate his own birthday; when they returned, the Chief Officer, subsequently found to have four times the permissible blood alcohol level, boarded the vessel and died after falling down some steps. The Captain was charged with breaching the vessel’s safety management system, and was fined 1800 pounds last month for allowing an ‘over the limit’ crewmember back on board. The British Union Nautilus points to increasing seafarer criminalisation and calls these developments ‘extremely disturbing’, adding that the Master’s decision to allow Mr. Buchan back on board was one in which he was ‘between a rock and a hard place’. What was he to do? Leave Mr. Buchan on the pier? What would have happened to him there? What if he had fallen and died on the pier instead of on board?


While explaining his reasons for letting the Chief Officer board the vessel, Capt. Phimister had earlier elaborated that the ship was not scheduled to leave for twenty four hours and there were other (and sufficient) crewmembers on board in case she was required to shift berth. Nautilus may be right when it says that this case raises ‘fundamental questions about the responsibilities of masters and the workings of the ISM Code’.


If these draconian rules must exist at the expense of all common sense, then this Master would like to see them extended to other matryoshka dolls, please. What about the ‘Zero Alcohol’ policy applying to people in other critical positions in the industry? Let’s see, now, by the same reasoning, no alcohol should be allowed to pass the lips of DPAs, Superintendents and others in emergency response systems or teams, Shipmanagement company senior managers, outsourced oil spill response personnel, and many, many such more. Not a drop. Ever. At any time of the day or night.


Sounds absurd? Then welcome to Bulgakov’s satire. Welcome, also, to Stalin and the devil’s Kafkaesque alternative.

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Undermining Overriding Authority.

The International Safety Management Code mandates, in respect to the Master’s overriding authority that , “The Company should establish in the SMS that the master has the overriding authority and the responsibility to make decisions with respect to safety and pollution prevention and to request the Company's assistance as may be necessary.”

It goes on to say, importantly that, “If senior management's commitment to the system and the company's efforts to improve safety and environmental protection performance are to be translated into effective action on board, Masters should be given every encouragement and assistance to implement the system. Any system of checks and balances implemented by shore based management should allow for, and sit comfortably with, the master's overriding authority and discretion to take whatever action he considers to be in the best interests of passengers, crew, the ship and the marine environment.”

To complete this wonderful picture, it asks the Company to ensure that the master is, amongst other things, “given the necessary support so that the master's duties can be safely performed.”


How nice. They should have a preamble, “Once upon a time”, so we would know at once that this is a fairy tale.


The only thing that is well and truly established, in practice, is the sentence of death in a manual somewhere that establishes the Master’s overriding authority on paper. After that, everybody heaves a sigh of relief at having successfully passed the buck and goes home.

Not only that, this is often touted as a ‘trick question’ and used by many auditors. Like schoolchildren, senior Masters are asked, “Where does it say ‘overriding authority’ in the ISM manual?”

No lollipop for the wrong answer. It would be hilarious if it weren’t so pathetic.


In practice and in my experience, the “Master’s overriding authority” is often a hollow term selectively used by managements. Its use to them is restricted to finding a mandated patsy; other than that, managements often behave as if ‘overriding authority’ is insignificant, even irrelevant.


In atrocious weather on a damaged ship not that long ago, there was expressed consternation when I requested allegedly reputed managers, on the phone, to get me expert technical advice on the residual structural strength of one critical and weather damaged part of the ship. The clear implication, said in so many words, was that I was somehow overreacting, and that ‘we know best’ (even though ‘we’ have not sailed for a decade each and our sensitive parts are not in a sling right now, as mine was). The fact that I pointed out, having worked ashore, that this would require just one phone call to one manufacturer and that it would help me make an important decision, was ignored. Mommy knows best. Or, how dare you have any ideas? Or, what can you really do, now that you are sailing and due to sign off. Not come back to us? Don’t.


Wonder what happened to the ‘give the Master necessary support’ bit in the ISM, or ensuring that the Master can ask for assistance where necessary. Assistance, not control.

Forget the emergency. Egos must be fed regardless and bean counting must continue. Absurd and disgusting.


Then there is the instance where I rang up Operations with a cyclone in the vicinity and told him that many vessels had sort refuge in a nearby port, or not sailed out under advice. However, since I understood the commercial implications of doing so, I was steaming at slow speed in sheltered waters close by, waiting for the storm to blow over and postponing the refuge decision. (I have the bad habit of telling managers the truths they should know about. Some people never learn.)

Panic at the other end at the possibility that I might seek refuge. Did I know how many problems that would create? Charterers would kill him. Capt. Xyz on another Company vessel was in the same port refusing to sail out: Owner’s wanted to ‘sack him’. And finally, a veiled threat, telling me to seriously reconsider. (In a similar scenario, I was once advised by a Company Superintendent to make copies of log books etc. ‘for my own protection’. I told him I didn’t need any, though management might.)


On the flip side, one can imagine the respect I have for one Superintendent who told me, in an emergency, to “do what you think is best. I will back you. Let me know if you need anything.”


My point is that the very possibility of the Master making an emergency decision often throws everybody in a tizzy. The overwhelming response is to push him into continuing with business as usual, if possible, or to hide pertinent facts from other parties. Managements want to mislead owners to score brownie points (or to avoid having the book thrown at them), Owners want to mislead charterers and so on; it’s like Spy vs. Spy out of Mad Magazine at times out there.


Owners and managers will sometimes cajole, bluff, lie, haggle and blame each other to keep expectations low. Manage with substandard staff, these are tough times. The spares are arriving at the next port. Owners are not agreeing to an extra officer even though one is required, but don’t worry, we are pushing for one, or at least a cadet (I need an experienced hand for safe operations and you are sending me a trainee?). The shipchandler goofed up. Ask the Chief Engineer if he can ‘manage’ without Oily Water Separator spares for another round trip. Can you hide important safety related stuff from the surveyor?

With each of those common instances, the implication is that the Master, officers and crew are ever ready to continue to sail on that near substandard ship. At each stage, these kinds of managers are daring the Master to exercise his overriding authority and refuse to sail unless issues are safely addressed. They know most won’t; statistics tell them so, and so do spineless Masters. (I confess that, at times, I have been one of them.)


This is part of the game, too. Wear the Master down if you can’t control his predilection for exercising his authority. In normal times this is an irritant. In an emergency, this is life threatening.


You should realise, gentlemen, that this is an emergency, and listen to what the bozo with the four stripes is telling you. You found him qualified and experienced and put him there. He is not your enemy. He may even be on your side.

Realise also that all of you ashore, regardless of rank or ego, are a support function and no more. Expert opinions, including yours, are welcome. Undermining the Master’s authority by any overt or covert means is against the letter and spirit of the very same Code otherwise found convenient by you when passing the buck, and is not welcome at all.


If this is unacceptable to you, please take over part of the Master’s responsibility, if legislation lets you. Then, and only then, can you take away some of his authority too.


In industry everywhere, authority and responsibility go hand in hand. However, the Master’s authority at sea is being constantly eroded while his responsibility is actually increasing. This happens when countries legislate or criminalise on matters which are not in the Master’s control. This happens when companies don’t match talk with action. This happens when Master’s are overwhelmed in today’s fast turnaround times with regular legislative and other issues and no shore support. This happens when the ‘Master’s overriding authority’ is used as a vacuous phrase, like a politicians promise at election time, with no muscle behind it.


This happens so often that it smells of a conspiracy.

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An attitude for survival.

A few years ago I faced, without doubt, the most dangerous crisis in my life at sea while in Command. Later, even after the dust had settled and the emergency forgotten, it took me quite awhile to analyse events; this happened slowly and long after the danger was past. Looking back at similar events in my career, I realised that while there are the inevitable 'what ifs' and 'maybes' to any such situation, there are many commonalities to an emergency too.

A break up of these common factors will have, usually, some or a combination of these elements: Long before the event, a safety element or two disregarded or underplanned, commercial pressure, fatigue, incorrect advice from ashore and mistakes made on board; sometimes numerous small mistakes which add up to a potential catastrophe. And luck.

During the emergency, a few of the crew will think and act appropriately on their feet, some will be beset by inertia and paralysis; annoyingly, some of the time will be consumed by sometimes useless communication. Other factors like fatigue, stress, equipment problems and morale are also common. And luck.

After the emergency, the management of the incident on board and ashore, operationally and otherwise, is the main imperative. Unfortunately, we tend to ignore one factor, a human one; the long term effect on the crew of a stressful life threatening situation.


It is easy to say that a Master, like all other seafarers, is trained to deal with emergencies, and stop there. My brief here is not to dispute the adequacy of our training, though I could well do that, it being a view I hold. However, my intention here is to suggest what I believe are good steps which should be taken on board in handling emergencies. That is, in addition to what we normally do.

I hasten to add that what I say is not meant to be a manual of any sort; just small things which I believe make a big difference. Though written for Masters, this may be helpful for everybody on board.

(I must stress that these are just some of the steps which happen to work for me and that I believe that there will be better and more cogent solutions from better Masters than myself. It is a pity we don't have a professional forum to tune this list and make it much better. We really should.)


Before the emergency

· I would put a 'Command mindset' on top of my list of essentials. Frankly, this includes the ability to say NO when safety or integrity is involved. No to everybody, from God to the Devil. Masters must learn to say no. This has to be cultivated in oneself beforehand; when the faecal matter hits the fan it is usually too late. Plan for safety. Say no to everything which comes in the way, including to the owners. That is part of your job. The thought should be: safety is my job and my responsibility and my decision. Inputs are welcome (provided they don't become useless and time consuming communication, especially in an emergency) but, in the end, this baby is mine.
· Safety is a continuous process. Plan beforehand. Do attend routinely to commonly downgraded or taken for granted (in today's busy commercial world) aspects of cargo, lashings, cargo shift possibilities, free surface effects in tanks, stability, watertight integrity, soundings, ventilation, securing high splash areas like the fo'cle and weather routeing services. Ignore checklists for this purpose. A Master's routine rounds starting soon after sailing works much better. Push a safety culture on board which stresses the importance of doing the basic things right. This is more important on short sea trades where routines are prone to be ignored. Anybody who has sailed in areas like the South China Sea or the North Sea on short sea trades will agree with me that weather does not look at the trade and neither does a fire, and that a typhoon can kill you as surely ten miles from the coast as a hundred.
· Be on top of safety issues unique to the kind of ship or its run. Educate yourself beforehand; if required, ask for information from the office.
· Do not accept dangerously low fuel reserves. Another common pressure tactic utilised which we often tend to succumb to. A voyage can easily take a few days longer, and often does. Fuel consumptions can be higher than anticipated for a variety of reasons. I for one don't want to run into bad weather and worry about running out of fuel at the same time.
· Make the fact that safety is your priority known to the officers, crew, managers and owners in said and unsaid ways. By doing so, you draw a line in the sand politely; it makes your life easier. In any case, you will be surprised how many support you even as some others will apply commercial pressure on you.
· Keep yourself updated regularly on board of deck and engine machinery problems. Build a rapport with senior officers for this purpose. (Avoid the CYA or blame game. It is a game with no winners.) An overview of possible problems is essential for a Master to gauge cascading effects of these and also to handle emergencies. Synchronicity of events can kill as surely as an explosion.


During the emergency:

This is not, as seen in one Cadet's dubious training text book, an exercise of "If the ship runs aground, stop engines immediately". This is a mindset exercise for professionals. My suggestions here:

· Think. Don't let yourself be overwhelmed by minutiae. Think about what can get worse, what else can go wrong and what your options are. Think ahead and be prepared. Shortlist reliable officers and crew in your mind for critical tasks. Keep thinking, like a chess game, as many steps ahead as you can cope with.
· Remain in Command and keep morale up. Keep calm. Panic spreads. Cultivate an attitude of 'us against the world' on board at these times. This keeps morale up as much as anything else, in my experience.
· Coordinate. Self explanatory, really, but what is not is that an individual's ability to multitask becomes critical. Speed and accuracy are vital here.
· Keep spare bandwidth. Don't run on top gear but keep some physical and mental reserve. You will probably need it sometime, and then you can move into top gear for awhile. This helps you keep physical and mental control, too.
· Seek information and opinions from on board and ashore, if required. Be aware that some will assume you are trying to pass on your responsibility by doing so and will bring this up much later as a Command failure. This does not matter. You are solving the problem. Besides, dogs bark. The caravan passes.
· Solve the problem and forget the peripherals. The smaller or the less important stuff, like heaven, can wait.
· Delegate. We are dependant on very basic things as well as big ones at sea. Everything from a torch and a walkie talkie to an Act of God can be critical at different times. So, delegate the small stuff to junior officers and the medium level stuff to seniors. Do not delegate a Master's decisions and actions; those are yours alone. If you start delegating these you start losing your authority. Chaos and panic can result quickly.
· Keep a log and records; this can also be delegated. Take photographs if possible and applicable.
· Be aware that some ashore will already be preparing for financial catastrophe while you are fighting for your life. That’s ok, that is their job. However, it is not your priority, so minimise non essential communication with shore/commercial interests. In fact, minimise all communication with shore unless seeking information, especially specialist information. Tell them so. Your concentration should be on the problem in your face. Do not let communication paralyse action.
· Be aware that you will hear, "Captain, you are in command, it's your decision" more often. Be well aware of the reasons for this statement, and for the fact that some firms will be recording what is being said on the phone.





After the emergency

· Make a conscious effort to defuse the pressure the crew has been under.
· Be aware much of the crew, and you may be suffering from PTSD (Post Traumatic Stress Disorder. I would advise any Master to have a basic knowledge of its symptoms. When it first hit me many years ago, it took me awhile to recognise what it was). Be aware that the maritime world will do nothing to address this; a seaman is expected to be the strong and silent type, and get ulcers.
· Be aware this is the time personnel problems will surface on board. Release of pressure can create its own problems.
· Be aware that many interests will now start playing the blame game and 'protecting their interests', often a euphemism for blaming the crew if they can.
· Stand up for your crew and officers who have performed well under pressure. And stand up to those who try to point unfair fingers at you.


And, when the accountants and their calculators take over the ship, take a minute to be satisfied with yourself. Leave the self analysis for later; it is too soon right now. Distance lends perspective, and one needs that if one wants to learn from this incident.

In closing, and as said before, this article is oriented more towards a workable mindset than a checklist for action; we already have enough of those, though shipping casualty rates continue to rise worldwide inspire (or maybe because) of them.

My suggestions are a psychological exercise; an attitude I find useful to have when Joyce's "scrotumtightening sea", or indeed any other crisis, comes knocking on your door.


Sometimes, the right attitude is half the war.









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Food for Thought

I first tried keeping all the provisions unlocked at sea well over a decade and a half ago, and have done so on many of the ships I have sailed on; maybe even most of them. I feel that as long as we can afford it, people should be free to eat what they want and when they want it.

My initial proposal of keeping everything including the reefer compartments unlocked has been met with widely varying responses on board and ashore. Many Chief Engineers are unhappy at the possibility that crew would not properly shut the provision reefer compartment doors and that the fridge machinery would get knackered. So far, the first has sometimes happened but never the second.

Most cooks and many senior officers have felt that consumption would shoot up through the roof. Sometimes it has, initially, but never for long. When one knows one can eat whatever and whenever, one does not use one's stomach for storage.

Some cooks have felt that some essential items like milk and juice, and some 'luxuries' like ice cream and yoghurt would be polished off, leaving the entire crew then short supplied during a sea voyage. True to an extent, but we have compensated by ordering more of these goodies initially and until the system settles down.

Relieving Masters have often been almost annoyed at my immaturity. There is also a common refrain of, "Then how do you manage?" I have been unable to determine what has to be managed when everything is kept open to all. The guys making a cut on the provisions purchased are obviously unhappy, too. I don't much care; I am paid for the duration of my contract, not theirs, and I am certainly not paid to promote corrupt practices.
Besides, I do not manage. The cook does.

Generally, most of the other officers and crew have been delighted.


Much as I prefer to keep everything unlocked, I have decided against doing this on a few occasions. This is invariably when the objections from a Chief Engineer have been very strong on keeping reefer compartments locked. I must say that most of the initial naysayers are happy to give my proposals a fair chance and often change their minds once it is successful, but there have been times when I have been unable to persuade a Chief to do so. I scrap the plan, then, on the principle that a person responsible for machinery should have some say in what is being done to it. I admit, though, that I am disappointed at this intransigence. Old habits die hard.

The success rate of this initiative has been a hundred percent. Not once has the provision room been locked after it has been thrown open; not once have any crew misused their free access to provisions in any significant way.

And we have saved money. So much so, that I started distributing gifts every two or three months to the crew out of the saved cash. Depending on various factors like the cooks efficiency, wastage and costs of provisions on the route, these gifts were often significant. I remember, once, a Chief Engineer and a Chief Officer going ashore and spending about three thousand dollars on gifts for the crew; the same gifts for everybody on board.

Superintendents and company reactions, too, have varied. Some have been happy, others not so. Overall, they have been remarkably supportive.

I explained once to a Superintendent that my options for the saved cash were either
a) Leave it on board to be misused by somebody or
b) Misuse it myself or
c) Return it to the Company which may then think their allowances were too high and act against crew interests.

I explained to him why I felt that none of these options was preferable; besides, it was only fair that the crew that saved the money should benefit from it.
The Superintendent in question seemed to agree with me, as indeed most companies. In any case, they did not disagree too vehemently, because not one has instructed me, ever, to stop my system.


Perhaps there are many Masters doing this already; I simply do not know. Many may be doing much better. Nonetheless, at the risk of preaching to the choir, let me detail my experience with this system a little.


Presumptions, preconditions and suppositions:

1. "Just like at home" is my first presumption. At home, one does not buy ice cream or expensive seafood, put it in the freezer and then instruct the family not to eat it until it is given to them. If we cannot afford it, we do not buy it. Once bought, we don't buy it again if we can't afford it, or not this month anyway. I do the same thing on board; the crew may get expensive stuff to eat as long as it is affordable. Trust me, everybody understands this concept perfectly.
2. One assumption is that there is be no psychotic amongst the crew who will throw all the meat overboard one stormy night. Of course, assuming this at the outset is paranoia.
3. The cook is competent and will surface teething problems to me reasonably quickly.
4. The fridge is not so isolated that a door mistakenly left open will not be noticed for hours on end.
5. It is preferable, but not necessary, for a 'Mess Committee' to be actively and concurrently involved in purchases and getting crew feedback. It is also much preferable for a full list of inventories of purchased provisions, including prices, to be available to all in the smoke rooms at anytime. The system works much better when it is fully transparent.
6. A good monthly inventory is a must, for budgetary reasons.
7. An important assumption: that the victualling amount provided for is sufficient for the ship and the run. (I have never seen one that was not.)
8. It is much preferable to have, as far as the run of the ship allows, minimum provisions on board at the end of every accounting month. Obvious advantages of easy accounting and flexibility in the next months purchases. Difficult sometimes, when one is departing a cheap port in the last week of a month for an expensive one.




Less obvious advantages:

1. Promotes integrity.
2. Promotes transparency. Excellent fallout advantages in other areas on board.
3. Promotes trust, which is, on its own, a very good idea.
4. Treats the crew like family. Eat what you want, when you want it.
5. Decreases a Master's workload. The only thing I have to really do is to watch the budget. The rest is taken care of automatically.
6. There are no excuses for bad food except bad cooking, because the Master or anybody else is canceling almost nothing.
7. I find that the crew makes a conscious attempt not to waste food and save money. Savings will come back to them in the forms of boxes of mineral water (depending on the run, drinking water supplied from ashore can be very unhygienic, as we know), chocolates, cookies or other eats in the cabins, or as presents, anyway.
8. Crew morale: This one should not be underestimated. When junior officers, how many of us have come back from work to find no milk in the refrigerator, or no juice? Just bread and butter. Sometimes not stocked, sometimes inadequately stocked and sometimes just plain consumed. In an era where there is no difference between day and night operations in port and even at sea, and when crews are short manned and overworked, it is ridiculous to follow the old 'quarter ho gaya sahib' routines of Indian companies, when trays were carried for officers to the bridge or engine room, and when provisions were dished out like at government ration shops for the crew. We all know of the games played in many of those ships. Therefore, any crewmember who can sit down and eat a decent meal after work (and whenever he wants to) is a much happier person, for he is being treated like a human being.



I must end with the story of a ship partly on the India run, where we happened to manage a particularly eclectic and quirky menu. It was customary, for example, to see a bunch of Filipino crew eating beer mugs full of Kwality Wall's pista ice cream for breakfast! Like delighted schoolchildren cocking a snook at the establishment and the headmaster. Offering each other more, bringing in leaking cardboard packs from the galley. I ask you, what could be wrong in being happy and content with small things?



In these days of minimal shore leave, food and victualling on board is more important for crew morale than ever before. The Master's responsibility is ensuring the quantity and quality of food, and the cook's job is cooking it hygienically and well. If, in the process, administration of the exercise is reduced, it is icing on the cake. In the end, this is a small matter; let us stop being control freaks and treat it as such.


I guess some of these views may be a little extreme. It has been indicated to me often enough.
All I can say in my defence is this: if I must be an extremist, I prefer to be one at the cleaner and more transparent end of the spectrum.

.

One Pressure Cooked Mariner with fries, please

With reference to the Command of a ship, one of the greyest legal areas I can think of is the relationship between a pilot and a Master, and indeed between a pilot and the navigational watch. It can be stressful, ambivalent and confusing at the best of times. Relatively newer practices and codes, including checklists and logs for ‘Master Pilot exchange’ have done little except generate more paper in an attempt to, well, CYA.

I have been witness to a near miss with a nearsighted pilot and a near moronic Chief Officer, who saw the boat fifty feet away and did not inform the pilot, because quote Cap, the pilot on the bridge, it his job unquote. Though this may be an extreme example, it highlights the confusion. What is a pilot? Well, traditionally it was advisor or “Servant of the vessel”- which put most of the liability on the Master, and therefore the Owners.

If this wasn’t confusing enough, we now have the Cosco Busan ruling against the pilot. This, in my view, changes, well, everything.

Let’s take a step back to try to understand the ramifications. Ignore the hype surrounding Capt. Cota’s alcohol, depression and prescription drug related issues. Ignore the dead birds and the oil spilled, even as you wonder how many birds have been killed and how much oil (not to speak of blood) has been spilled in Iraq. Ignore his 27 years experience or his recourse to the Fifth Amendment. Ignore his pancreatis and migraines and CPAP machines and apnea- remember this is a country which is used to finding specks of dirt on it’s Presidents’ and Presidential Candidates’ shoes, and so a marine pilot is, like the birds, fair and easier game.

Ignore the hoopla and come to the root of the matter. Which is, answer this question
“What is the legal role of a Pilot and/or the Master on the bridge of a ship in US waters?”

“Search me” is my answer. Perhaps somebody in the room has a better one.

Not an idle question and answer session, this. People are going to jail for these “crimes”. Criminalistion of the seafarer is fait accompli; it just got expanded to include pilots. However, at least we mariners are entitled to know the areas we are individually and collectively liable in, and which one of us will go to jail for what, and who will do what and to whom, and so on.

Or is that too uncomfortable a question?


Come to think of it, many other such grey areas exist in a Masters day to day working life. Idly thinking about this, and paraphrasing, here is a random compilation from my own experience. I hasten to add that these grey areas are usually exploited to create pressure, one which unfortunately many of us mariners succumb to. And, actually, so is putting a mariner in jail – not for a criminal act, but for an accident- a pressure tactic.

If we mariners had any sense, we would, similar to airline pilots, refuse to sail, or operate, from the very moment there was a possibility of lower safety, or when any of the myriad rules were broken. Our threshold of acceptable risk is just too high in today’s blame game world.


This would mean ships held up in port or delayed at sea, longer voyages and lower profits, higher costs for garbage and sludge disposal and maintenance of critical machinery (how many times have the engineers been less than happy with the separator’s performance and struggled with it daily?). It would mean turning the profit and loss statements and balance sheets of companies on their collective heads. It would mean a hundred changes to practices, stores and spares, manning and manning certificates, safe ports and terminals, pilotage and weather routeing, safe speeds and bunker and water reserves.
It would also mean a lower chance of a jail term, so, gentlemen, maybe it is time to prioritise.

But apologies, I digress and transgress.

Anyway, here is my promised grey area compilation of pressure tactics. Some suggested responses are in brackets, though to save time and stay ahead of the curve, perhaps you should take out that suitcase first, if you are sailing. Else, enjoy.

Trust me, all these incidents happened in firms many of us would consider ‘standard’.

I repeat, too, that these are paraphrased- even slightly exaggerated. But these incidents are essentially true. Actually, I must confess that one or two of the suggested responses are more than just ‘suggested’. One lives and learns and hopes...


· Charterer’s rep: “Captain, I have sailed in these waters for a long time and nobody reduces speed in thick fog and zero visibility, and nobody even doubles watches or uses the foghorn. However, and psst, you have overriding authority.” (Suggested response: That is indeed excellent. Why don’t you take over from me and crash at 25 knots using your overriding authority instead of mine?)

· Manager: “It is very difficult to get good junior officers these days. Though I understand you are always in fog and narrow waters in one of the busiest traffic density area in the world, why don’t you manage with this useless and dangerous guy for sometime?” (SR: Ok boss. But since I am doing all his work, and since the manning certificate is a joke, why don’t I sack him instead and you give me his wages in addition to mine?)

· Superintendent: “During your next port stay of ten long hours, I am coming down to Port Chaos. We will call Class and do six surveys. We will also do a ship inspection, an ISM audit and have four beers in the evening. Meanwhile, don’t forget the cargo, stores, sludge disposal and crew change and such small routine stuff, and stop people even dreaming of going ashore”. (SR: Great! Since we will also ‘do’ the crew, -and since I hear it is a peaceful berth and a wonderful place for stopping the ship so everybody can sleep till we comply with the mandatory rest periods, we will do that too. Will you inform Operations or should I?)

· Superintendent: “That equipment is critical for the survey. I don’t know why the Chief is saying it has been knackered for months and has been mentioned so in his handover notes four months ago... It was working fine last month when I was there.” (SR:Then you should have done the survey last month)

· Owner’s representative: “What do you mean a Flag State Inspection has stopped the ship because of holes in the funnel?? Why didn’t someone point them out to the Superintendent when he visited last month? How can they expect us to renew plating before the ship sails. Can’t you make an arrangement with them and get the ship moving? How come you didn’t report these holes when you joined a week ago?” (SR: Yes, I probably can make an arrangement, but in case I get jailed in this country reputed for strict laws and low corruption, will my contract and wages be on till I am released, at least? And apologies, next time I will go directly to the funnel of any ship with a toothcomb as soon as I step on board)

· Dry Dock Superintendent to Chief Engineer: “Chief, there is a lot of oil around in the water from the yard just outside the dry dock. When are you are afloat, can’t you lower your bilges a bit?” (SR: Yep, and maybe my pants too?)

· Operations: “Captain XYZ always loaded five hundred tonnes more cargo than you. Can you explain why you are loading less?” (SR: Lemme try. We are unfortunately limited by deadweight. Also, you see, he was often sailing with the loadline well immersed, because he also had problems taking out the ballast. Can I send you photocopies of the official log book where the Chief Officer has logged down sailing drafts? And if so, do you want the same officer’s statement confirming this, or will my word do?)

· Manning Superintendent/DPA who has not sailed for a decade and a half: “Captain, the charterers are complaining that you have informed them, based on calculations, that many containers are under declared in weight, and hence you may have to shut out cargo. If you do that, we will spoil relations with them, which we must avoid at any cost. Can you send me a full report ASAP right now, even though I understand it is past midnight over there?” (SR: Sure. Make sure the secretary you have arranged to assist me is blonde with blue eyes, please?)




Come to think of it, some of these incidents are quite funny. Maybe I can write a book next time I am behind bars. As the management types say, in every adversity there is an opportunity.

Mariners seem to be getting a lot of opportunities these days.



First published in www.marexbulletin.com