Kitty litter and the STCW amendments.

Never mind that the war is being lost: the good folk at the Manila STCW conference did what the Americans would love to do in Afghanistan and Iraq: declare victory and go home. Meanwhile, in the wake of the ‘Manila amendments’ (this nomenclature will long cause heartburn to many a presumptuous Indian) will be found the usual debris of the dashed hopes of seafarers.


Bluntly put, the Manila amendments read like a business plan and not a serious attempt to address issues related to training or fatigue of watchkeepers at sea. They results are the maritime education industry’s wet dream: the new requirements and “guidelines” will open up new revenue streams for these MET businesses that have proven to be largely substandard in all major seafarer supplying nations of the world.

Regardless, new training will be required in ECDIS, “marine environment awareness” (whatever the hell that is), dynamic positioning systems, navigation in polar waters, leadership and teamwork, security, liquefied gas tankers and OSVs, to begin with. Later on, we will be blessed with new training and certification for electro-technical staff. And, in a pathetically hilarious interlude, “New requirements for security training, as well as provisions to ensure that seafarers are properly trained to cope if their ship comes under attack by pirates.” (Cope? What is cope, please? Is it like a cop out?)

Fatigue, the second major issue, has been covered in the usual blinkered and cynical manner, and is, in a way, a testimony to impotence. At a time when present rules are universally ignored and ships are operated every day with fatigued watchkeepers, the IMO, in its infinite wisdom, ignores this blatant non-compliance. It admits, though not in as many words, that it cannot do anything about Safe Manning Certificates that are within the purview of Flag States (who, as we know, have no interest in making their flags less attractive to owners). Instead, the STCW amendments come up with new provisions for hours of rest for watchkeepers: ten hours minimum a day, 77 hours a week and with the usual claptrap of details and exceptions. Is this the best we can do, two decades after the issue of fatigue surfaced?

All that I foresee, because of all this ballyhoo, is a fudging of rest period records on an even bigger scale post the Manila amendments. I do not know anybody who seriously expects anything different. Ten hours a day? Seventy-seven hours a week? I hear the industry scoff: what do you people think this is, a luxury cruise?

The third major issue addressed was related to certification- measures to prevent fraudulent practices and other such subjects. Seafarers can move along: nothing much for them here either.

The problems I have with the Manila amendments are many, but the continued myopic system of regulation, guidelines and amendments has to be my biggest objection. Consider:

• Problem: many MET institutes in the major seafarer supplying nations- including India and the Philippines- are way below par. The IMO’s solution: none.
• Problem: seafarers are already hugely burdened with costs and time for training. The IMO’s solution: add more training.
• Problem: piracy and the failure of the ISPS code. The IMO solution: salt on mariner wounds. New training in anti-piracy and security.
• Problem: existing rest period requirements flagrantly ignored. The IMO solution: amend them upwards. That should do the trick.
• Problem: IMO sets minimum standards, member States interpret, but the interpretation is often egged on by businessmen. The IMO solution: none
• Problem: too much regulation, too little compliance. The IMO solution: more regulation.

Thank God, I don’t intend to sail anymore. Besides the obvious reasons, I cannot think of anything in the Manila amendments that will greatly promote safer seas or cleaner oceans, or indeed make the career any more attractive for a new seafarer- another IMO objective, at least on paper, in this “Year of the Seafarer”.


To end, a short story: We often leave a large plastic tray filled with kitty litter when we go out for the weekend. The cat does the dirty deed in it, and then covers the waste up by pawing around and covering up with clean litter. The kitty litter is then good to be reused again. And again, after some more pawing and covering up.

Thing is, once in a while the old faeces has to be cleaned up to keep the tray clean, else the cat will just not use it. Perhaps we should have done that first, this time with the Manila amendments, before we poured new litter into the same old bin. Maybe there is a lesson for all of us in there, somewhere in the kitty litter.
.


.

Groundhog Day

I have in front of me an article from Lloyd’s List that refers to a UK Department of Transport report on fatigue among seafarers. Michael Grey’s article is titled, “Fatigue facts jolt shipping’; the report Mr. Grey refers to is written by Professor Ivan Brown of the Medical Research Council.


The author comments on the report, “its recommendations on the control of seafarer’s hours will probably ensure that it will regrettably disappear forever in fathomless archives, to appear after a decent interval only for the enjoyment of researchers and academics.”


What’s new, you ask? What is new is that the article is almost twenty years old. It appeared in Lloyd’s List on March 15, 1990. I found it amongst the junk I have collected over time.


Some of the academics here will point out, of course, that we had a STCW convention a few years later that addressed this problem. Some may even forget to remind us that not only these (and such subsequent) reports have disappeared forever from our consciousness, even the STCW convention as it pertains to fatigue rears its ugly head only at decent intervals these days, and is otherwise largely ignored. Compliance is routinely fudged; the record of watchkeepers working hours and rest periods at sea is often unadulterated fiction.


In 2006, quoting a comprehensive survey approximately a decade after the STCW convention first came into force, the ITF reported : “One in four seafarers said they had fallen asleep while on watch. Almost 50% of seafarers taking part in the study reported working weeks of 85 hours or more. Around half said their working hours had increased over the past 10 years, despite new regulations intended to combat fatigue. Almost 50% of seafarers surveyed considered their working hours presented a danger to their personal safety. Some 37% said their working hours sometimes posed a danger to the safe operations of their ship.” Things did not get better over time; as we know very well, they got worse.


Two years later, in February this year, the UK’s Maritime Accident Investigation Branch took the unprecedented step, after an investigation into the ‘Antari’ grounding, of a) directly blaming the IMO for failing to address this issue even after a similar MAIB safety report (concerning fatigue) was forwarded to it two years earlier and b) asking the UK government to unilaterally take action to address the safety and environmental risks in British waters caused by seafarer fatigue. The MAIB ‘Antari’ report was scathing; unusually strong phrases like ‘Seafarer working hours are close to slavery’, ‘Watchkeepers routinely falling asleep’, ‘Ships are unguided missiles” and ‘Just a matter of time before there is a catastrophic accident” were used in the report: a sign, perhaps of the frustration the MAIB felt.


What had the IMO to say in reply? Well, as usual, not a lot. It confirmed that the UK had submitted a proposal to the Safety Committee, fully two years ago, asking that “an auditable procedure for establishing vessels’ safe manning levels should be introduced”. That was all the IMO did, though I am sure some impressively worded correspondence has been produced in the interim. I am also sure that the matter is being taken seriously by the mandarins at the IMO even today. We must realise that only six months have passed after the MAIB report, and that these things take time, as the twenty year old report quoted in Lloyd’s List and the 2006 report quoted by the ITF proves. I read these periodic reports with bemusement: all the regulators really need to do is to visit a ship to know what is happening on the ground, and how commonplace fatigue at sea really is.


When it comes to the resolution of the fatigue issue, the sailor may be forgiven for thinking that he is actor Bill Murray in the movie ‘Groundhog Day’, doomed to living the same day over and over again for eternity. Even worse, there is no Andie Macdowell on the horizon either; an event that would help considerably in keeping him awake on watch, I think.


Of course, many industry bodies have raised the subject sporadically and anaemically. Pilot associations, Cargo and Classification society surveyors have complained about tired crews unable to function effectively. Port State Control officials have mentioned seafarer fatigue in some of their reports, and so have individual Superintendents and the like. Some organisations even have online and offline forms for reporting fatigue. Accident statistics are legion too: the high percentage of accidents caused by human error and the alarmingly high odds that a chronically fatigued seafarer will make mistakes and cause accidents have been underlined ad nauseum in a plethora of seminars across a spectrum that seems to cover all points of the proverbial compass.


However, all this, again, is academic; because all of us, at sea or ashore, need no reminding that the problem exists. Compiling data is not an alternative to solving the problem. In addition and as far as the commercial industry is concerned, there is no real problem. A fatigued seafarer is the least of their concerns anyway.


I am afraid that the maritime industry has become immune to this issue; Groundhog Day has played out too often. The repercussions of following the STCW convention on fatigue are seen as too expensive. The requirements of additional officers and crew, or even (gasp) an additional Master (or, perhaps, taking some administrative functions ashore) that would undoubtedly be required to fully comply with the rules is seen as unnecessary. I cannot see any Owner doing this unilaterally, raising operating costs and making his ships uncompetitive in today’s bloody marketplace. Which means that, as usual, additional requirements will have to be mandated from ‘above’. I do not see that happening easily either: the benign nexus between industry bodies and the commercial world is usually at the expense of the seafarer.


The only way we will get some traction to begin addressing this burning issue (that has been ablaze for two decades or more, as shown) is this: We need a series of spectacular and catastrophic accidents, the root cause of which is found to be seafarer fatigue. We need to see these well publicised in mainstream media, as they probably will be if beaches and seagulls coated with oil are a result. Only then will there be sufficient pressure put on the industry, including the regulators, which will make everybody act immediately. Remember the ISPS code that happened within weeks of 9/11? That worked. Something spectacular. Something that presses all the buttons in a way that a fatigued mariner never will, even if he suffers long term health deterioration as a result of chronic fatigue. We in shipping are famous for post disaster regulation: maybe that is the only way we know. Alternately, we can prepare to relive Groundhog Day for another twenty years.


In 1990, Michael Grey commented on Professor Brown’s report thus: “Perhaps the report is a signal to start off with a completely clean sheet and try to adapt the way of a ship to the working practices of a human crew rather than the other way around”.

Sorry, Mr. Grey, the cleanest sheet we have been able to arrange, after two decades, is the murky spreadsheet recording individual watchkeeping working hours at sea; it may interest you to know that not only are the figures routinely doctored, fudged sheets are sometimes even photocopied for use next month!

.



.

Certifiable Insanity.

I started sailing in the seventies. ISM, checklists and computers did not exist, and-though there were load line and SOLAS and all other regulations and certificates- these rules, regulations and procedures were at a twentieth of what they are today. Paperwork was minimal- and what little there was, the Purser, Radio Officer or Chief Steward took care of.
And the Master was rarely seen except at the lunch table, during pilotage or when going ashore.

Fast forward to today. A dirrhoea of paper, computers, emails, forms, checklists, surveys, statutory and State regulations, payroll, accounting and mandatory record keeping and filing is an everyday part of a modern officer’s job. So much so, that more time may be spent on this than on any other single task, with more regulations and trigger happy shore staff adding to pen pushing without reviewing old systems and reducing paperwork requirements.
The skills required from seagoing officers have gradually shifted over the years. A lot of my cadetship was spent with a sledgehammer chipping rusty decks of a thirty year old ship (and gleefully making holes in them). A cadet today likely spends more time with a pen or keyboard than with a chipping hammer.

I haven’t even started on the increased workload in cargo, navigation and other requirements yet. The reduction of manpower and the incremental increase in the crew’s involvement with cargo- including lashing, sometimes tallying and usually cleaning up before and after- has a cascading effect on fatigue and safety. Short manned ships mean that at a time when most crew need to be rested and sharp- post departure and pre arrival port- is when they are usually most fatigued.

It is obvious that we need differently qualified officers today. The old sea dog is giving way to the babu at sea. Be that as it may, the new seafarer must be able to manage computers and electronic equipment, have a higher fluency in English to manage the myriad manuals, checklists, forms and regulations- leave alone read the ISM manuals written by Shakespeare and copied and pasted by a half dozen companies into their own manuals. We need sharper people to manage all this and more on short manned ships- and we need mentally tougher people to manage the pressures of present day regulations and long stints with no effective shore leave. We need more appropriately qualified personnel.

So what does the industry do to manage all this effectively? Well, close to nothing, actually. For a start, it does not ensure most people on board are sufficiently qualified or proficient in English and it does not gauge their multitasking or computer skills. It does not even always know an officer’s proficiency in keeping independent watch before he joins! This is regardless of the IMO saying that “The resolution notes that safe manning is a function of the number of qualified and experienced seafarers necessary for the safety of the ship….”

It gets away with this because of one piece of paper, small but deadly: the Minimum Safe Manning Certificate.
I suppose it’s better to laugh than to cry here. So, this is one of the funniest pieces of paper I have ever seen. The Safe Manning Certificate, to my mind, is like safe sex. You have to be prepared for both long before you walk in the door. Once the action starts, the participants really can’t do anything much about it, except just stop. And then they will all have to go home, or will be sent home.

Issued by a Flag State that does not want too many people to be mandated on board else Owner’s may choose another flag, used gleefully by managers to attest to the fact that they are meeting requirements by appointing the requisite number of heads on board, ignored by all the crew but not the Master, the Minimum Safe Manning Certificate should be renamed the Minimum Manning Certificate- not much is safe about it.
It takes no account of the ship’s run, complexities in navigation and manoeuvring, the crew’s involvement with cargo or the myriad other functions taken for granted in today’s maritime world. Just a small example: it takes no account of the number of people required to be involved in simultaneous cargo, bunkering and stores- and ISPS- operations, which are usually undergone in almost every port by almost every ship, day in and day out.

The various parties involved will undoubtedly cover their various sensitive parts with various appropriate statements- Safe manning is not supposed to cover cargo- that is the Owner’s business. Or, what can we do if a certified officer is found incapable of keeping independent watch? Or, Captain, use your overriding authority. Or, apologetically, we can’t convince the Owners why we should exceed the Manning Certificate and place another third mate on board the ship which is touching twenty ports a month and is always in congested waters and fog. Or, finally, Captain, let us know if you can’t manage (and we will take till the end of your contract and beyond to reply).

There is only one thing to be done to correct this problem, and that is this. I urge Flag States to review their Manning Certificate policies, if they have any- and on a priority basis. Ship’s must be appropriately staffed for their at-sea and in-port operational complexities, including the run and also including the owners or charterers dictated cargo operational requirements in port. Present manning certificates seem more of a one size fits all solution- Pamela Anderson will attest to the fact that this premise is false, and so will many seafarers on complex short-sea trade cargo ships. A car carrier on a short sea trade has totally different requirements for manpower compared with a cape sized bulk carrier in port.

Ignoring this port requirement automatically ensures fatigued seafarers at sea, with lower safety and resultant higher casualties. Casualties that the industry is bemoaning now, by the way.

Even as I write this, the recent announcement that Indian Flag Bulkers will have their Safe Manning Certificate reduced by one deck officer is doing the rounds. Indian ship-owners will undoubtedly welcome this move. Once again, this sweeping reduction takes no account of the age, condition, complexities of operation or the run of individual bulkers; once again, one size fits all.

And, while on Safe Manning Certificates, time for one of my favourite rants:
It is very rare to find a requirement for a cook on a Manning Certificate. Though suited and booted mandarins in various Flag States will undoubtedly point to the fact that a cook has no critical function impacting watch keeping or operational safety, this attitude is precisely what gets my blood pressure up. It showcases- with alarming clarity and the usual regularity- the cynicism and callousness of the industry. Seafarers do not need food for safety, so why put a cook in the requirements? Leave it to the owners’ and managers’ goodwill and good sense. Maybe they will open a McDonald's franchise on board instead.

Or wait! Maybe more artistic owners will combine two functions once again, and- voila! A new rank- a combination "Master and Chief Cook"!

The mind boggles, seafarers groan, innocent bystanders laugh, and accountants in shipping company offices drool at this possibility.

.