Private Maritime Security Companies- as middlemen using
mercenaries for ship security are somewhat grandly called- are in bad financial
shape; they are victims of their own success. Armed guards on ships have meant
that Somali piracy has collapsed, even if temporarily, since many warn that
pirates are biding their time until guards are taken off from ships leaving
them defenceless once again. Anyway, since armed guards cannot be legally
employed in much of the other piracy hotspot on the Western side of Africa-
they are illegal in Nigeria- PMSC business has been drastically hit. The Gulf
of Aden Group Transits, one of the largest PMSC operators, collapsed
spectacularly a few weeks ago, leaving a million dollars in unpaid salaries and
abandoning a hundred British and East European mercenaries on ships as if they
were third world crew. (That somebody else is looking after these mercenaries
now, repatriating and paying them, reinforces the value of the right skin
colour). Other operators are also said to be in dire straits.
Unfortunately, the reality is that armed guards are the only
proven way to protect ships from armed criminals of any hue- pirates, thieves,
terrorists or whatever. The reality is, also, that attacks on ships are here to
stay. The theatre may change; Somalia yesterday, West Africa and parts of South
East Asia today and somewhere else tomorrow, but the play will remain the same.
Ships are easy targets and the world is ill equipped to tackle attacks on ships;
everybody knows that.
A shipowner’s default setting veers towards a ‘no armed
guards’ scenario; the industry sees the high expense (a big multiple of the crew
wages it loves to crib about) as justified only after an area has become very
dangerous to sail through. Armed guards were put on ships around Somalia years
after some of us were screaming about that being the only way. Hardnosed owners
and insurers obviously do not want to pay thousands of dollars a day for armed
guards unless they feel the risk-reward ratio justifies the large expense.
So the questions remain unanswered. How do PMSC’s survive
when demand fluctuates wildly? Does the business model across industry factor
in the use of armed guards in trouble spots, whether occasional or regular (on
ships that spend most of their time in these war zones?). And of course, does
shipping really want to protect their crews from armed criminals and terrorists
by paying for mercenaries?
I only know the answer to the last of those questions- no. I
can also see which way the answers to the others are likely to go. PMSC’s will
have to make their business model more flexible; perhaps maritime security will
be just one of a bouquet of security services they will offer to broader
industry, pulling out people to place on ships when asked to do so. Or maybe by
employing mercenaries only when and if required.
Shipowners and cargo interests will have to get used to
putting armed guards on ships and offshore installations as a first or second
resort, not the last. Their financial models will have to be tweaked
accordingly. Maybe a time will even come, if this menace spreads or persists,
when the industry and its regulators will consider arming crews instead. Maybe.
That is for the future. But even today, bodies like the IMO should
be using their parent, the United Nations, to pressurise countries into
accepting PMSC’s – and guns on ships- as a legitimate need essential to
protecting the billions of dollars of ships and cargo that move across
dangerous seas. We know that the alternative- refusing to sail ships off West
Africa today, for example, or in other hotspots tomorrow- is just not going to
happen.
Making maritime security financially, legally and operationally
viable is something nobody is looking at, but that is exactly what needs to be
done. Today.
.
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