Death before dishonour

Disclosure: I derive a part of my income from the maritime education and training industry. Nevertheless.

When something is unsustainable, it falls apart eventually. Like the crony capitalist economic system that is today imploding across the world. Or, more pertinently to shipping, the present maritime training setup in India that has been going downhill ever since the STCW95 fiasco and the diarrhoeic deluge of third rate Maritime Education and Training(MET) establishments in this country (and others too, but let us stick to us). The resultant plunging MET spiral was inevitable and has been in process for close to two decades by now, underscored by blatant, rampant and unbridled corruption in administration and industry, greed, callous neglect, tumefied egoism and simple cussedness shown by all involved stakeholders.

The MET assembly line is now falling apart- it is dying, actually. There are few takers for its substandard product, and, while the pimps that proliferate in the street and in shipping offices will continue to ensnare the gullible for some more time, the priest should be called in, because it will soon be time for the reading of the last rites. New STCW conventions will not do anything. There is only so much rouge one can put on a syphilitic streetwalker; there comes a point when the disease cannot be hidden any longer. That point has arrived for MET. 

The impending death of the present maritime education circus will be a good thing; I shall not mourn its passing, because I believe that we need to destroy the diseased system first in order to rebuild. There is a risk, of course, that we may not get order out of the resultant chaos once we destroy. But if we don't destroy, there is an absolute certainty of the lingering death of the patient with no chance of resurrection.

While everybody has their own differing thoughts on overhauling MET, all recipes have three recommendations in common- a) Dramatically improve structure and delivery of all maritime education- and, thereby, quality of product; b) Guarantee on-board training and c) Do not promote distance learning programmes (DLPs- or KLPDs, as I uncharitably and crudely call them) at the expense of seatime.   

(There are some other common thoughts that resonate in addition, but they are broadly covered by these three basics. For example, a) would cover making pre sea education practical and relevant as well as re-examining useless STCW courses, b) would cover the tonnage tax regime and the need to take in only those trainees that the industry can place, c) would cover the primacy of experience over an academic certificate, and so on.) 

By the way, I welcome death of the present MET patient over the option of its 'treatment' for another reason- I believe that corruption and greed will ensure that treatment will never work. The training institute will always want to just fill its seats, hang employment or on board training of its graduates. The touts - whether in government or private industry- will always want to protect their commissions. The egotistic in national and international administrations will always want to expand their fiefdoms and justify their existence, such as it is.  The (somewhat grandiosely called) shipmanagement chop shop will usually want to get trained people free. 

It will require mortal struggle by a handful of intrepid visionaries just to knock down the present rotting edifice; to change it from within will require years of single-minded effort, with the existing gang fighting you every step of the way with every weapon in their arsenal - legal, political, industrial and even criminal. Therefore 'treatment' cannot be done.  Actually I am not even sure that we have, within the diseased system, enough integrity left to let the present seafarer factory die, or enough fortitude left to withstand screaming MET establishments, disgruntled pimps or the sound of the explosion of punctured egos if the system is dismantled.

But die it must, so we can protect five thousand years of maritime heritage, not to speak of times more recent when Indian seafarers built, brick by brick, a reputation that is now being cast to the wind. Not to speak of jobs for Indians or other spin off benefits to India, its economy, its industry and its people. 

So there is absolutely no doubt in my mind that the present MET assembly line must die so it can be reborn and restart afresh. Along with this must die the touts, the indurate, the obstructionists, the out-of-date and the egotists, for the dishonour they bring down upon all of us is worse than death.

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Is Barkis Willing?

The irony is not lost on me; the UN's IMO spent years promoting Best Management Practices as the way to contain Somali piracy, when some of us were saying - sometimes to the point of exasperation, as my column will testify- that armed guards were the only short term solution. Owners and insurers eventually sidestepped the IMO, employing armed escorts of varying integrity in increasing numbers. Then, when it became clear that what we were saying was right all along- the numbers of successful hijacks plunged because of armed escorts - the IMO suddenly appeared to rediscover some old apprehensions about the whole business, and started examining the process of regulating the security industry. The United Nations led BMP bandwagon- propagated, cynics say, at the behest of Western commercial interests- was rolled back; the IMO could not justify the charade any longer, so it stopped trying to regulate BMPs and started on security companies instead.

Today, a few years later, the wheel is coming back full circle with a delicious quirk. The Asian Shipowners’ Forum has now submitted a detailed plan asking for UN armed personnel to board and escort merchant ships through the Somali pirate kill zone. The ASF's  'Blue Beret' solution involves floating bases- converted containerships stationed strategically in the Indian Ocean- that will become the embarkation and disembarkation points for a total of about 800 UN soldiers working in four-man escort teams. The ASF represents shipowners’ associations from Australia, China, Hong Kong, India, Japan, South Korea, and other ASEAN countries; oddly, their proposal would cover only 30 ships- 40% of the 80 vessels pass through the high-risk area- every day. The cost for the 40%? 12 million dollars for purchasing the containerships and another 12 million a year for operations. 

Anyway, here is the sting, intended or not. The ASF says that it prefers the UN route but, as an alternative, seems to propose that a few like minded countries get together to form an armed force if the UN plan doesn't materialise. And, although I am sure that the safety of crews is not the ASF's highest priority, some of its members do represent a part of the world that produces a huge number of seafarers, not to speak of Indian fishermen who seem to be a favoured target of trigger-happy soldiers these days- not least the Italians and the Americans. 

The ASF plan seems very logical on the face of it. After all, the United Nations Security Council does have the power and responsibility- under the UN Charter- to take collective action to maintain international peace and security. The protection of international trade must surely rank high on the list by this definition alone. As for the money, ongoing US peacekeeping operations (8 in Africa alone) cost the world 5 billion dollars annually; what is another piffling 24 million?

So why hasn't this been done so far? - is the first question that begs to be asked. It is not as if the ASF proposal is one that has been mooted for the first time: far from it. This question goes to the heart of the matter of the manner of the UN's functioning, even its relevance. Over the years, how much of the UN filibustering on piracy was at the behest of countries with their special interest groups in the insurance, kidnap and ransom and maritime security companies?  How much of the flimflamming is attributable to bureaucracy and how much to malice? How many diplomats fiddled while sailors burned? 

In any event, the ASF plan is embarrassing for the UN and the IMO. Here they were, years ago, discouraging armed guards and producing 'new improved' versions of the BMP almost every other month. Nothing was working. Later, they grudgingly accepted armed guards but continued to attribute the improved situation to the 'success' of BMPs and navies. The industry knew different. It voted with its feet, putting more and more military escorts aboard its vessels. 

So, embarrassment for the UN if it accepts ASF's recommendations. Why didn't you go this way earlier? Many told you to get involved long ago. You could have sidestepped the entire BMP circus and the private armed guards issue- the quality of many security companies was suspect right from the start, and you knew it. Your member States knew it. Some of them even counted on it. 

Alternatively, if the UNSC disregards the ASF recommendations, of course, the industry will continue the 'private armed guards' route- whenever and wherever its assets are threatened in future- the dangers of which are well known and do not require repetition here.  

Of course, the ASF figures on costs will have to be reworked if the UN gets involved. For one, these cover just 40% of effected ships. What happens to the other 60? For another, the UN and its bodies do not do anything cheaply. I am sure those Blue Berets will get their rest periods, even if crews on the ships they protect do not. More connected questions: Why restrict this to Somalia? What about growing West African piracy? 

I don't know what will happen with all this, but the odds are not in favour of the ASF proposal. Will some of its member countries balk at the thought of Blue Beret interference in the territorial waters of sovereign nations? Will the UN and its bodies be pressurised by special interest groups through their host States again? Will bureaucratic lassitude continue? Will the charade be orchestrated again? Will everybody finally see the light? Will the fear of setting a precedent- that would require UN peacekeeping Blue Beret solutions for future security threats at sea- make the UN and the IMO back off the ASF proposal? 

Is Barkis willing?

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Shipping's last-straw threat

image:goenglish.com

Forget China. The unchecked, repetitious reckless and malicious behaviour of Western countries remain the bigger threat to peace and economic growth - and trade-in South Asia and the Middle East. 

The Iran oil embargo is going the Iraq way. The aim of the game, as in Iraq, is to give the dog a bad name and starve him. Therefore sanctions, same as in Iraq. If, as a result of the isolation, half a million children under five die because of malnutrition or lack of medicines (567,000 died as a direct result of sanctions against Iraq, according to UN figures; a price US Secretary of State Madeline Albright said on TV was 'worth it') then it is just tough bananas again. 

Because of US led sanctions, Iranian crude output has fallen to a 22 year low; it was pumping 4.1 million barrels a day in January 2008, it now pumps only 3.2 million. Iran is losing $3 billion in lost revenue every month; 60% of its shipping company NITC's tankers are being used for storage of oil that has nowhere to go. 

And who in the world is covering this shortfall? US ally Saudi Arabia, Russia and- guess what- Iraq, with plundering Western companies and US lackeys in the government laughing all the way to the bank. Incidentally, the US announced recently that all American assets belonging to NITC would be frozen. Iraq redux.

True, about 20 countries have been 'granted' waivers by the self-appointed policemen of the world; they can import Iranian oil 'at lower levels'. Indian and Japanese governments will underwrite their vessels because the western dominated insurance market is closed to them, thanks to the sanctions, effectively stopping their ships unless alternate insurance is arranged (see ''Marine Insurance or economic warfare?' published May 3 here). Nonetheless, the impact on energy starved India of a continuing choke of Iranian oil will be extremely severe. 

Oil industry experts are now saying that Iranian crude output is headed even lower to roughly half its 2011 numbers, and will plunge to a record 1.3 million barrels a day this month. The tanker trade is not doing much better internationally, as we know, with owners struggling to break even. Should there be a further decline in demand- or a further decline in oil prices that have started rising again- the tanker segment of the industry might find that it is well and truly on the mat. Parts of it geared to carry Iranian oil already are.

Overall, shipping is not complaining so far; the oil embargo has forced most countries to seek new markets, caused a major shift in demand and disrupted fuel supplies in some countries. Additionally, it is not a bad thing for shipping that NITC's tankers are effectively grounded, Iranian front companies notwithstanding, as the sanctions have taken out the Iranian fleet from a market that simply has too many ships floating around for its own good.

The threats to shipping from planned western hegemony over the region-that nobody seems willing or able to check-cannot be overstated. US and European sabre rattling has usually led to a major military conflict here, as it did in Iraq. Shipping today can ill afford the dying of trade, escalated war risk premiums, threats to its assets and other upheaval that another war in the region is guaranteed to unleash.

Even a low intensity conflict is enough to choke an industry already gasping for breath. Iranian response to the sanctions so far has mainly been twofold: One, it is talking in Istanbul on nuclear issues with the 'P5+1' - Britain, China, France, Russia, the United States and Germany- with much grandstanding shown at the pulpit there by all concerned. Iran has, elsewhere but simultaneously, repeatedly threatened to close down the Straits of Hormuz, arguably the most critical chokepoint for shipping in the world, given that forty percent of the world's seaborne oil passes through it- and a fifth of all oil- 17 million barrels everyday in 2011.  

The US and Iran have clashed before- in 2008- in and around Hormuz. They are on track to do so again. If that happens and escalates, the resultant chaos that will hit shipping will make the present economic upheaval look like a Sunday school picnic. Chances of an all out Iran-US war may be low now, but chances of a skirmish are not. Keep an eye out.

As the camel said before the concluding piece of straw was strapped onto his back, things are bad enough as it is. 

(You may also be interested in Marine insurance or economic warfare?)

The hawk and the minnow

graphic- Telegraph, India.

There is something simple in the thought that India can counter China's 'string of pearls' strategy by ratcheting up military spending or expanding Indian military presence in the region. India's simultaneous strategy of building alliances with countries as far away as Vietnam and Japan- its own string of pearls, if you will, to encircle China- are likely to be a little more successful. But just a little, because India is operating from a position of immense weakness- that it continues to ignore at its own peril.

The soon to be commissioned Indian Naval Air Station NAS Baaz (the word means 'Hawk') at Campbell Bay near the Nicobar Islands- which will superintend the six degree channel close to Indonesia- seems like an excellent idea on the face of it; after all, anything from a quarter to forty percent of the world's trade (50,000 ships) passes through here every year before entering the Malacca Straits, as does, more importantly, eighty percent of Chinese oil.  Campbell Bay is to become India's easternmost forward operating base; military aircraft and ships will spy on the Malacca and Sunda Straits from here; experts also seem to think, somewhat simple mindedly, that India will be able to threaten to choke the Malacca Straits after Baaz is up and flying.

It is equally naive to think that Baaz will be able to contain the sixty percent of naval assets that the US wants to deploy in the Asia Pacific as part of its new 'rebalancing' strategy for the region- something India, with its non-alignment bent- is understandably wary about.

Some Indian weaknesses are apparent and do not need elaboration- economic and military disadvantages, for example. India will not be able to trade blows with China on these two fronts. The Chinese string of pearls- the projection of Chinese geopolitical, military and diplomatic power through the Malacca Straits right up to the Persian Gulf- operates from a position of strength. Countering this effectively- even with tacit American backing- will require more than just dreaming, or a Baaz or two. 

Other Indian weaknesses are not so apparent- well, they are, actually, but it is assumed that they either will be sorted out or are peripheral. Trust me, they are not peripheral at all; they are absolutely central to our ability to project power in the waters around us.

Corruption, for example. It is laughably asinine that a country whose coastline remains porous almost four years after the Mumbai terror attacks- even Somali pirates have been 'found' on the mainland not so long ago, having swum there- can project its naval or military power thousands of miles away from its shores with any confidence. Corruption's close cousins- ineptitude, unaccountability, nepotism and lethargy- will continue to ensure the failure of both policy and execution in future. The fact that corruption- endemic in Indian politics, industry and bureaucracy- has spread alarmingly into the military establishment is well known by now. At least I have little confidence that this has not castrated the country's ability to defend itself- or to project its military power (I was aghast when I heard a former Army Chief say, reacting to a question on corruption in the armed forces, 'But we are not as bad as Pakistan!' Is that our benchmark now?)

In addition, in connection with the NAS Baaz, one question is this: In a country riddled with corruption, are such military decisions taken keeping the national interests of a billion Indians in mind, or are they taken for the personal interests of a dirty dozen or two? What is the quality of these decisions?

India- already being referred to as the first "Fallen Angel" of the BRIC countries-has other huge weaknesses that make it unsuitable, to put it mildly, to aspire to be a regional satrap. Rising disparity and destitution (there is something odd in the statistic that says that more people have been 'lifted' from poverty but destitution has increased) have created a schism in society- the Naxalite 'Red Corridor' is the prime example of this. The country's resources are on fire sale; everybody- politician, industrialist, intermediary, and bureaucrat- wants a piece of the action. Critical institutions hollowed out by corruption and mismanagement, administrative paralysis, public and private sector corruption are today, when combined with a young population, a dry tinderbox waiting for a spark. All the ingredients are already in place. Major civil unrest is simply a matter of time.

What does this have to do with China or Baaz, I hear you asking. I could somewhat cynically reply that a country that cannot control Dal Lake in Srinagar has no business trying to control the Indian Ocean, but that would miss the bigger point, which is this:

Conflicts between large nations rarely end up in military face offs these days- and they have not for a long time, because the stakes are too high in a nuclear world. Powerful countries usually attain their geopolitical objectives (or personal loot objectives, as in Iraq) in other, insidious ways. Lies. Subterfuge. Proxy wars. Spreading influence. Strengthening economic ties. Bribing. Plundering natural resources after bribing. Spreading discontent within disaffected populations in target countries.

We are no stranger to these ways; our enemies have succeeded too often here. We have played the game ourselves- in Bangladesh and Sri Lanka for example, and are playing it in Eastern Africa today. The Indo-Chinese game will see all these tactics again, especially since the Chinese are allied with Pakistan and its 'death by a thousand cuts' strategy targeted at India. The problem for India is that its social schisms, born out of rising disparity on one hand and destitution of many of its citizens on the other, are weakening it at the very point where the enemy will logically attack.

So, expect more unrest in the Northeast, in the Red Corridor and elsewhere. And, while it is true that China suffers some of the same problems as we do- corruption and internal unrest, for example- it nevertheless pursues its geopolitical interests with single-mindedness, strength, integrity of purpose and continuity. India does not.

So, there will likely be no India-China face off in the Malacca Straits or anywhere else. That is not the way today, and we are too weak. I believe that we will only get strong if we address the tumultuous issues at home first.

We won't become stronger with NAS Baaz. Not while that hawk is crippled with a broken wing. We cannot be sharks in the Bay of Bengal and minnows at home; that does not compute, because minnows are only good as bait.

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