Maybe it is
time to stop dishing out inane ‘lessons learnt’ when it comes to accident or
incident reports. I understand that this is convenient and makes for good
economics with insurers and all, but enough is enough, don’t you think?
Just one
case in point- the UK’s Marine Accident Investigation Branch has brought out a
Safety Digest for the year. One of the reports there pertains to two ro-ro
vessels that broke their moorings at different times in an unnamed European
port in high winds; one grounded on the opposite bank with some damage to her
ramp (before she was eventually re-berthed) while the other was brought under
control quicker with the use of tugs and thrusters.
Under the
‘Lessons Learnt’ section of the report, the MAIB repeats many shop-soiled bromides
as if these were something that crews were unaware of, or were not following
for the most part. “Keeping a high sided vessel alongside in strong
winds was (is?) always going to be a challenge,” it informs us. It goes on to use
shatteringly painful (to a seaman) terms like ‘appropriate precautions’,
‘contingency options,’ avoiding being ‘lulled into a false sense of security’
and ‘confirmation bias’. It tells crews to “prepare a contingency plan” (Oh no,
not another one, I hear the groans) which sets limits that trigger a response
and avoid using selftensioning on the winches in high wind ports. And to (aha!)
check moorings frequently.
Let me give MAIB- and some others ashore who concur with
this rubbish- the perspective of just one guy who has sailed in command of
maybe two dozen ro-ro babies all over the world, including a couple of them
doing around 20 ports a month in Europe and the Mediterranean:
1.
Crews on Ro-Ro ships are fatigued to a degree
that dwarfs even the high fatigue levels on most other ships. In addition to
the usual reasons that the industry dumps on them that contribute to extreme fatigue,
these crews put up with a new port (in often a new country) every few hours,
extremely short ports stays, sometimes multiple terminals in ports and constant
lashing and unlashing of cargo, in port, before arrival and after departure. In
the high traffic density areas of Europe in winter, Masters and bridge
watchkeepers are constantly on edge while sailing, with poor visibility and high
seas (remember the North Sea?) often the norm. In port, they are often required
to perform ISPS duties covering multiple access points (on one ship, one
gangway and two ramps were required to be manned). In short, they may not have the time or the
energy left in them to react to emergencies in the way they should.
Lesson that should be learnt: Stop rogering
the crews any further! Follow your own laws related to rest periods! Instead of
berating and threatening him, support the Master who anchors the ship for the
crew to get some rest (me!) or who wants to stop the practice of crew lashing
and unlashing the cargo to give them some rest (me again!)
2.
Quite a few car carrier ports or terminals in
Europe suffer from frequent high winds-Zeebrugge in Belgium comes to mind, but
there are many others. I have seen ports like Bristol in the UK and Livorno in
Italy closed due to high winds more than once. And I forget the name of that
disaster of a terminal in Turkey- just a finger sticking out into the water-
that was particularly unsafe- with an incompetent pilot, a corrupt
administration and a dangerously inept tug thrown in for good measure. These terminals and ports are not built to
take in the big high-sided vessels that operate today.
Lesson that should be learnt: Build or
modify terminals to make them fit for purpose. Back Masters when they say some
ports are unsafe (Me again. Someday I will tell that story)
3.
The requirement already exists that operators
and charterers must send a ship to a safe terminal in a safe port, although managers
usually shudder violently if a Master brings up this legal concept. Another problem
is that many managers, even some of those who have sailed, do not sometimes have
enough shiphandling experience to comprehend what the Master is trying to explain.
Besides, most do not care. What they are really thinking of is, what will the
charterers say if the Master officially claims that the port is unsafe? How
much of the crap will hit the fan? If it does, are we, the managers, covered? Is
our client a big shipowner who will walk away with many ships? If the Master is
right and an accident takes place, are we insured? And of course, how do I, the
manager, protect myself and my job?
Safety is much lower down the list of
priority of these blinkered minds.
Lessons that should be learnt: One, listen
to what the Master is saying about safety! The poor sod may be right. Two: Stop
worrying about covering your own behind- that attitude impedes progress,
whether at sea or ashore.
What the MAIB wants ro-ro crews to do is
right. But the lessons it chooses to ignore make it dead wrong.
.
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