Not many in commercial shipping thought
too long or too hard about President Pranab Mukherjee’s statement when it was
made in the Indian Parliament in early June, where he announced that the government
would form a National Maritime Authority (NMA). This is because they thought this
was to do with the country’s maritime security. He said as much. His exact
words: “Recognising the importance of coastal security, my government will set
up a National Maritime Authority.”
It appears now, from the buzz in
media circles, that the NMA is going to be an overarching body that will oversee
not just maritime security but all aspects of commercial shipping as well,
including trade and commerce and the offshore industry. Interestingly, media
reports suggest that the NMA will make redundant the Directorate General of
Shipping, which, under the Ministry of Shipping, deals with all executive
matters relating to merchant shipping. So far.
If so, I think the NMA concept is
ill conceived, overly cumbersome and a grandiose idea that lacks the required
attention to detail. Let me tell you why.
The idea of the NMA (actually, a
National Maritime Commission) was pushed by the Institute of Defence Studies
and Analyses (IDSA) in May. Now, the IDSA is a Ministry of Defence funded think
tank that has little expertise in maritime commerce. It is therefore, in my
opinion, not qualified to suggest any kind of changes in the regulation or
conduct of commercial shipping. That is assuming it did so in the first place,
and that the reported possible disbandment of the DGS is not the result of some
bureaucratic fancy.
More importantly, making the NMA
responsible for two huge and distinct maritime functions- security and commerce-
is setting it up to fail. The DGS looks after just one of those today and is nevertheless
overwhelmed by its mandate to perform Flag State, Port State and Coastal State duties,
not to speak of specific environmental incidents and the overview of commercial
maritime education in the country. The NMA will have its hands full with
coastal security alone, a massive undertaking that has still- after so many
years since the Mumbai attacks- to be brought under meaningful control. The NMA
should therefore not be given any other brief- especially a completely discrete
one from security- like handling commercial shipping.
I am told that the NMA is supposed
to be constituted along the lines of the proposed
Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) — which is a centralised agency that will have effective aviation safety and oversight control
and will replace the present Directorate General of Civil Aviation. I will point
out that, if such a body is given the additional responsibility of taking care
of security in the skies, then the CAA idea is as equally fraught as the NMA
proposal. Our legislators should avoid the same mistakes many laymen make- security,
safety and the promotion of commerce are three entirely different beasts.
Many writing for mainstream newspapers disagree
with me about the apparent need to do away with the DGS. To them, the NMA idea
makes sense. They point to the need to follow and merge IMO regulations with
national ones. They rehash the age old criticisms of the DGS- that it is an
organisation always led by a non-maritime person (who is transferred as soon as
he or she has settled down!) and one that fails to attract the required numbers
of professionals with the required expertise. An organisation that is weak and
clumsy, has legacy and governance issues and has outsourced some of its
functions- for example, to do with oversight on maritime education- to third
parties like the Indian Register of Shipping and the like. An organisation that
is under-resourced and so not adequately equipped to carry out its
duties. Therefore, in their opinion, the NMA is exactly what we need.
I don’t think so. Because, for a start, there is every
likelihood that the proposed NMA will face an identical situation with respect
to lack of resources or professional expertise as the DGS suffers today. Also, I
foresee that, if the NMA replaces the DGS, many existing DGS personnel will
simply be transferred to the new NMA, which will otherwise be staffed (probably
in Delhi) by ex Indian naval or armed forces officers and bureaucrats with
little knowledge of commercial shipping. I predict that such a National
Maritime Authority will suffer from all the ills of the DGS, and will, in
addition, find itself burdened to the point of paralysis with maritime security
issues that can be overwhelming all on their own.
Instead of proposing a big bang change that sounds
good on paper but is likely to ring hollow in the end, the Modi government
needs to think this NMA business through. The solution, in my opinion, is not to
have a single body doing everything, but to keep maritime security separate
from safety and the promotion of maritime trade. To revamp and strengthen the
DGS and make it accountable. And, as always- always- attract the right people
to do what needs to be done.
The government should realise that generic
weaknesses cannot be overcome by the pouring of old wine into a new bottle. A grand
plan, if not backed by the ability to execute it, always results in equally
grand- even spectacular- failure.
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