The sordid tale of the Puntland
Maritime Police Force should remind the industry, once and for all, that it
will do well to not rely on the international community to solve its security problems
in future. Instead, it should fall back on the use of armed guards whenever
marine assets are threatened in the first instance. Because the ineffectual initiatives
of global powers and the UN are hostage to either a head in the sand attitude,
cupidity or stupidity- or all of the above. We in shipping could have saved
ourselves considerable heartburn had we put armed guards on our ships more than
a decade ago. We should, in fact, place armed guards on all our ships off East
and West Africa today and wherever else tomorrow without second thought and
without delay. It will be safer, more effective, straightforward and cheaper.
This, then, is the short and
bitter history of the Puntland Maritime Police Force (PMPF), about five hundred
of whose soldiers are today abandoned in desert camps, unpaid for months- and sitting
on an arsenal of assorted weaponry. No doubt they will gravitate to the highest
bidder in that failed State- Al Qaeda’s Al Shabaab, pirates or assorted
warlords. Take your pick.
Starting 2010, the PMPF was ostensibly
created to fight pirates on land. Millions of dollars of UAE money was spent and
mercenaries from shadowy companies - the South African Saracen and, later,
Sterling from Dubai- were flown in to train and arm local recruits. The
involvement of the ex US Navy Seal and CIA linked Erik Prince- of Blackwater
infamy, who now lives in the UAE- was never in doubt; he is supposed to have
made many trips to the PMPF training camps.
Quizzically, the UN first praised
the PMPF and then- later- cried foul, saying that Sterling was creating the
force in a “brazen, large-scale and protracted violation” of the arms embargo
in place on Somalia. Stories of torture and killings of a few PMPF Somali
trainees started doing the rounds. In April, a South African trainer was shot
dead by a Somali trainee; three months later, Sterling abandoned Puntland,
taking its people and equipment but leaving an arsenal and dissolute
semi-trained gunfighters behind.
Sometime while all this was going on,
President Faroole of Puntland was being feted as keynote speaker in an antipiracy
conference in London last November. The same Faroole was accused by
investigative journalists in Africa of sharing in pirate booty, by the way, but
since when did that all matter to the morality of the British?
Governments count on falling back
on the cushion of plausible deniability. The United States would have us
believe today that the formation of the PMPF was at the behest of the UAE and
that the US State Department and the CIA had nothing to do with it. They would have you and I ignore the dots
connecting recent US history of mercenary involvement- in Afghanistan,
Pakistan, Iraq and Libya, for a start- with the PMPF in Somalia. Ignore the fact that Erik Prince’s Blackwater
has got 1.6 billion dollars from the US government since 1997 for covert
operations- it is its biggest private security contractor. Ignore that a former
CIA Mogadishu station chief was enrolled to support the PMPF. Ignore that the
PMPF was using some of the same facilities of Faroole’s Puntland Intelligence
Service that “has been trained by C.I.A. officers and contractors for more than
a decade”.
For shipping’s security issues,
the situation is exasperating for other reasons. For example, the blind eye
that has been deliberately turned by Western governments to the involvement of
the Al Shabaab terrorists with pirates. Acknowledging these links would mean
that ransom payments would become illegal, and there would go, for example, the
billions that the British insurance and security companies make off the so
called anti-piracy business. That aside, acknowledgement would mean taking the
lid off a Pandora’s box of legal and foreign policy problems.
The “war on terror” is actually
what all Western actions connected to Somalia are really pretending to be about.
What they are really about, behind the pretence, is control of Somalia. Therefore,
the recent victories of their proxies- the Kenyan and African Union forces-
against Al Shabaab in south Somalia and their own drone strikes in the wider
region must be heartening for them. But for shipping, Western actions have collateral
advantages at best; nothing more. Nothing that changes the game.
The bottom line is that the
international community is fighting a different war than one that shipping
needs it to fight. The war being fought may, if won, ease the piracy problem
somewhat, but that is not good enough.
They will not change the war for
us, it is clear. Not now, and not in future either. Their response to West
African piracy, for example, is more likely to be determined by self-interest
than the need to protect ships, seamen or trade. The PMPF experience is just
one proof of this. The experience will not teach shipping anything new if it is
repeated elsewhere.
Which is why I say armed guards at
the first sign of trouble, anywhere in the world in future.
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